Private Sector Involvement in Slum Upgrading
Judy L. Baker and Kim McClain
I. Introduction and Background
Living conditions in poor urban slums, characterized by a
lack of basic public services and infrastructure, precarious housing,
overcrowding and often escalating social problems, remain a major and
growing challenge in cities all over the developing world. It is now
estimated that one in three city dwellers, a billion people, a sixth
of the world’s population, live in slums.
Governments and the development community have invested significantly in
improving the lives of slums dwellers through a range of upgrading
programs which typically include infrastructure investments (water and
sanitation, waste management, electricity, roads), and in some cases
interventions aimed at improving tenure security, social infrastructure,
housing quality, access to credit and access to social programs. The
immense and growing scale of slums has, however, outpaced the impact
these programs alone can have. When considering the scaling up of such
efforts to address the growing problem, it is clear that the public
sector cannot do it alone and there is much need for alternative
approaches. One such approach with enormous potential is the
mobilization of additional private sector finance and expertise.
Slums are the spontaneous response of the poor to their own
needs for shelter in cities. They are essentially a private phenomenon,
which responds to market incentives and distortions without extensive
government interference. Slums form part of the informal economy, and
they house many of the informal economy’s actors. Slums thrive and grow
because a significant amount of economic activity contributes to the
provision of basic shelter, water, food, energy, and other goods to slum
dwellers. Slum dwellers are often entrepreneurs themselves, but their
demand also attracts other informal entrepreneurs. For example,
so-called “illegal land developers” ignore zoning codes, minimum service
requirements for residential subdivisions, (and in some cases even the
property rights of the land holder) to sell small un-serviced plots on
vacant land, often at the urban periphery, to the urban poor and new
migrants. While not a legal business, the process by which these illegal
subdivisions allocate land, as in many other types of slums, is entirely
market-based with prices that respond to the level of land security,
location, proximity to transport and employment, and the size and
quality of the plot itself.
In slums that have not received assistance from NGOs or the government,
the informal private sector has likely been the exclusive means for
development, highlighting the market system on which slums rely, the
basis for envisioning an expanded role for the formal private sector.
The formal private sector has played a role in slum creation
as well as the role of injured party, defendant of property rights, or
passive landlord. Private landowners may even be complicit with the
“land invasions” and “informal land developers” that establish slums on
their property because it opens the opportunity to charge rent to
inhabitants while legally reserving the right to evict squatters when
better opportunities for commercial development arise.
In general, the formal private sector’s attitude toward slums
has ranged from indifferent to quietly supportive, primarily because
slums house the informal economy which provides goods, services and
labor at low costs.
The relationship between slum dwellers and business interests has,
however, been strained and even contentious at times.
Slum creation accelerates with migration and can encroach upon land that
is wanted for commercial development. The many negative externalities
associated with slums, such as crime, disease, and poverty, can also
spill out of the slums into the larger city, affecting businesses
directly and the city’s image.
The private sector’s interests regarding slums are not clear cut or
homogenous, thus understanding them within the local context is
important to approaching and negotiating programs with the private
This excerpt is from
a more extensive paper on private sector involvement in slum upgrading.
The two sections included here explore the challenges and opportunities
for scaling up private participation in urban upgrading activities and
the models through which this can happen. Other sections of the full
paper also cover current approaches drawing on specific field examples
and some of the more innovative solutions both the private sector and
its partners have developed, as well as some of the issues and
challenges that complicate the private sector’s active involvement in
slum upgrading within different contexts.
A final section looks at opportunities for working with the private
sector in scaling up slum upgrading initiatives.
II. Challenges and opportunities facing
the private sector in engaging with low income urban areas
The wide array of relationships the private sector has had to
slum upgrading and the many innovative mechanisms that have been piloted
to encourage these can be described as a mélange of diverse responses to
the many different contexts in which slums exist. There are a number of
challenges and opportunities in working in low income areas which have
been addressed in many different ways. Key issues include the
environment for private sector activity, some of the main barriers
facing the private sector, as well as the opportunities for both private
sector and slums to benefit from engagement.
Economic environment and the state of the private sector
The state of the economy will have a tremendous impact on how
the private sector can be mobilized for slum upgrading. A booming
economy may attract private finance towards higher yield investments and
away from lower yield investments in slums. It may also provide
opportunities, however, to harness the demand for high-end real estate
development to cross-subsidize affordable housing, as through TDRs.
To the extent that economic growth is effectively converted into greater
tax revenue, it can also improve the chances that municipal governments’
will be able to attract private finance for slum upgrading projects.
The economy will also influence the profile of slums and slum
dwellers. The size, shape, and growth of slums depends not only on
housing and land markets, but also on migration to cities, the informal
sector, and unemployment rates, which are in turn shaped by economic
growth. The levels of poverty within a slum are critical to the
strategies employed to involve the private sector, and the economic
state of the city will largely determine the opportunities for income
available to slum dwellers.
This is by far the largest factor in spontaneous slum upgrading carried
out by the residents themselves, and so it will certainly impact how
interested slum dwellers are in cooperating with private sector for
The state of the
private sector itself is also critical. In many countries the formal
private sector is relatively small and may have limited capacity and
even more limited resources, and is often highly risk averse making it
easier to focus investment opportunities with the wealthy. The depth
and capacity of the formal financial sector to mobilize capital is an
even greater problem. While the informal sector is also a private
source of slum upgrading activities, it may not bring to the slums the
benefits of economies of scale, investment capital, long run corporate
accountability, and integration of the slum into the greater city that
are normally pursued with private sector partnerships. The formal
private sector may be severely limited in its demand for investment
opportunities and as such will not respond as enthusiastically as hoped
to opportunities in slums.
Barriers to private sector engagement
The private sector faces a number of barriers and
disincentives to targeting the low-income market or engaging with
efforts to upgrade slums. Often the choice not to pursue low-income
clients or entry into slum markets is a very rational one considering
the business, political, and economic structure and environment.
Businesses are often ill-prepared to service the low-income market, and
their lack of experience with poor clients makes them even more wary of
exploring profit-making opportunities in the slums.
corporate culture in many developing countries does not foster
collaboration with or service to the lower-income segment of the
The predominant business model tends to pursue low volume, high profit
margin markets as the key to business success. Low volumes are believed
to imply fewer administrative costs, but they must be accompanied with
substantial profit margins. High profit margins are more acceptable to
consumers at higher income levels. Corporations also often have trouble
with pricing structures that stray from a basic unit-pricing scheme,
making the transition to differential pricing, which can make servicing
low-income clients profitable, more difficult. Internal corporate
policies also can get in the way of servicing poor clients. The most
common policy to impact slum dwellers is the collateral requirement for
loans. Since most slum dwellers do not hold title to their land (and
therefore cannot claim secure ownership of any improvements on that
land, such as a house or workshop, either), they can present very little
collateral and as such are not eligible for loans with formal sector
Businesses also respond to national and local business environments,
including the financial sector, business laws and regulations,
transaction costs, and industry standards, that are often too
conservative, costly and idealistic to meet the realities of poor
consumers. Laws regarding business contracts, quality standards, labor
benefits and wages, building codes, and bookkeeping regulations, among
others, increase the cost of doing business in a country and restrict
the range of products that can be offered. Poor people’s effective
demand is often for housing and services that are considered
sub-standard by law, thus blocking the formal private sector from
providing these products without a special waiver. This is particularly
problematic with regard to building codes and the poor’s preference for
lower-risk, progressive construction of housing.
Companies that install infrastructure must present evidence that
customers have the right to make changes to the land, which is normally
enshrined only in a legal land title. Zoning laws can further restrict
how land can be developed by legally barring companies from residential
infrastructure installations despite the existence of a community of
residential consumers and regardless of the legal title held on the
In the financial sector, overly conservative reserve
requirements restrict the supply of funds for lending, driving up
interest rates, and banking laws often mirror corporate policies by
requiring high levels of collateral for all lending.
Government regulation of utility prices can also discourage utility
companies from investing in the more costly infrastructure required to
service slum communities when there is no possibility of charging more
to recover the higher costs. Particularly when investment is scarce,
business-owners rationally choose to pursue the low-hanging fruit of
wealthier markets where business regulations are less of a barrier.
Governments may also have the ability to unilaterally change
the terms of contracts with businesses, such as for service provision or
as part of public-private partnerships, which can lead to a reluctance
of companies to bid on government contracts without substantial measures
to mitigate political risk. Lastly, companies are acutely aware of the
risk of social unrest in response to changes in service provision, such
as the decline of subsidies, the transition from a flat fee to metering,
and the removal of illegal service connections.
The government’s support of companies in these transitions is critical
to success and to maintaining the companies’ image. Conversely, the
government can act opportunistically and prefer the political benefits
of siding with the people. While the political environment is more
critical in private sector provision of public goods, the government’s
understanding and support of the private sector and market mechanisms
will influence the general public’s opinion of businesses and
profit-making, and thus shape the relationships companies can build with
Public good investments.
One of the more fundamental economic problems facing the private sector
in contributing to slum upgrading is the fact that many of the goods
required by the poor are either purely public goods, or goods with
strong positive externalities that create minimal private demand.
Streets and pathways, public lighting, rainwater channels, public parks
and public security are pure public goods that once supplied, cannot be
denied to anyone in the neighborhood (nor to visitors for that matter).
Potable water, sewerage, solid waste collection and disposal,
electricity, healthcare and public education are goods that can be sold
privately to varying degrees, however, denying them to people who are
unwilling or unable to pay is not socially desirable because of the
positive impact these goods have on the entire community. It is also,
to varying degrees, difficult and costly to restrict these services,
once installed, to only those who are paying. In both cases, the
incentive to free-ride can be strong, making cost-recovery for the
company uncertain. In fact, in some slums, the absence of a formal
service provider leads slum-dwellers to make illegal connections to
nearby electricity, cable television and water networks. Many companies
may further interpret poor people’s low income as increasing their
propensity to free-ride, though there is little evidence to support this
suspicion, and private companies are often not willing to risk making an
investment when they may not be able to collect payment for their
Public goods are often considered the domain of the state, as
this is the only institution that can effectively coerce payment for
these goods through taxation. States, however, often do not have the
capacity to provide all goods deemed to have positive social benefits,
the starting point of this work. States do, however, create a political
environment around these public and social goods that shape the private
sector’s willingness to get involved in providing them. States may
claim that water, housing, health, and education, among other goods, are
basic rights of all citizens, thus making them political issues. When
the quantity, quality or price of any of these goods is not in-line with
what society considers acceptable, politicians have the incentive to
intervene in the market, in the best case, with subsidies and other
incentives, and in the worst case (for business), with price controls.
In India and Brazil, for example, housing is considered a basic right of
all citizens enshrined in the constitution, and politicians have
consistently used the provision of free and highly-subsidized housing to
This raises poor people’s hope of acquiring free government housing and
can decrease their willingness to pay for housing provided through the
Property rights and land titling.
There has been extensive study of the need for recognized and defensible
property rights to attract private sector investment. There is a body of literature that considers land titling in slums the
most critical intervention that governments can do to spur private
investment in slums. Certainly lack of permanent legal title is one of
the defining elements of most slums, and it undeniably shapes private
investment in housing and neighborhood upgrading, by both households and
businesses. The proportion of households with access to secure tenure is in fact
the only indicator for the MDG related to improving the lives of people
living in slums. There is, however, a considerable gray area between holding a legal
title and absolute precariousness, and there is also considerable debate
about the true influence of land tenure on willingness to invest.
As most governments have come to recognize the existence of
slums and accept them as marginal poor neighborhoods rather than illegal
squatter settlements that need to be cleared, slum dwellers have gained
differing and fluctuating levels of security of tenure.
This security may be informal, but it may be strengthened by pro-poor
policies, land being public and without competing owners, historical
longevity of the community, low demand for land development and
correspondingly low land prices, or other factors that help guarantee
that slum dwellers won’t be evicted. Some governments also establish
semi-formal lease or registration systems, whereby slum dwellers,
particularly on public land, make renters’ or settlers’ arrangements
with the government that give temporary legal right to occupy. Street
addressing within slums has also been used to give a semblance of
official location and recognition to individual homes in slums and
normalize the slums as integrated neighborhoods.
The importance of land titling and the extent to which it is
a barrier to private sector involvement is a hotly contested issue.
Some development professionals believe that it requires excessive time
and effort that is only fruitful with significant political will, making
it a distraction from the more direct issues of infrastructure and
health that slum dwellers more desperately need. On the other side of
the debate, the only long term, sustainable strategy is to ensure people
have legal title to their land so that private investment can happen
spontaneously. A common middle ground is that both land titling and
slum upgrading can progress simultaneously, but that neither should be
made to wait for the other.
A final barrier to private sector engagement with the poor is the lack
of knowledge and understanding between the two groups. The culture gap
between the formal private sector and the urban poor can be significant,
making private businesses wary of attracting poor clients and poor
people distrustful of private businesses’ intentions. Many formal
businesses do not see low income customers interested and able to pay
for the services they provide. They may fear the crime they hear
reported in the slums and believe that they would risk damage or loss of
property. The formal business sector historically has had limited
experience with poor clients, which impacts its ability to gauge risk,
measure demand, and perceive the tastes and desires of the market. In
some countries, class stereotypes limit formal business-owners from
seeing poor people as a potential market altogether.
The misunderstanding and distrust can go both ways, as poor people may
perceive formal businesses as exploitative, greedy, and unfair to both
customers and workers alike.
This may mean that businesses have to invest in building trust with
their potential clients in poor neighborhoods before fully perceiving
the benefits of entering these markets.
Opportunities for private participation in slum upgrading
Despite the considerable barriers mentioned above, there is a
growing awareness of the potential for both slums and businesses to
benefit greatly from the engagement of the private sector. The poor,
who make up the bottom or base of the economic pyramid (BOP) with less
than $3000 in annual income (2002 PPP), total over 4 billion in numbers
and over $5 trillion in purchasing power. Hernando de Soto’s theory of
property rights also proposes that the poor have considerable “dead
capital,” $1.2 trillion of it according to a 2003 study, in the form of
untitled land (slum properties themselves) and unregistered businesses,
that can be mobilized through titling and business registration. There
is also increasing recognition of the considerable resources generated
through remittances that are often channeled into housing and education.
In 2005, $167 million in remittances were officially recorded entering
developing countries, and as much as 50% more may have been transferred
If organized and leveraged correctly, the poor’s purchasing power can
represent a significant market capable of enticing the private sector
into producing goods and services that improve living conditions in
Much of the poor’s purchasing power currently fuels the
informal economy, and thus represents an un-captured market for the
formal private sector. The informal economy produces an estimated
average of 30% of official GDP in Asia, 40% in Eastern Europe, and 43%
in both Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean making it a
substantial proportion of the market.
While the informal economy represents an important complement to the
formal economy in providing services to the poor, informality can bring
with it higher costs of production related to smaller scale, lower
quality goods, unsafe and unsanitary practices, exploitative pricing
strategies, inconsistency, and other quality and price differentials
that disadvantage the poor. This “poverty penalty,” as it has been
termed, hurts the poor and makes a clear case for encouraging the formal
private sector to extend services to the poor. And the fact that the
poor do regularly pay a price premium should convince the formal private
sector that there is real demand and ability and willingness to pay.
While spontaneous private sector initiatives that benefit the
urban poor will continue to happen, there is still a need for public and
donor funding and assistance. More importantly, the potential for donor
funding to mobilize even greater amounts of private capital is an
opportunity that must be recognized. Some programs to encourage
investment by local capital markets and slum households themselves have
mobilized upwards of 7 times the program budget in private investment.
The multiplier effect created by allowing poor people to contribute
their own investment and offering a profit-making opportunity to private
investors is a critical force for scaling up slum upgrading efforts.
There is much to be gained not only from private sector
finance and investment, but also from private sector expertise in
efficient management of projects. The private sector has much greater
experience in cost-minimization and the effective use of human
resources, among many other strategies for efficiency. Formal private
economic activity in slums also creates opportunities for wage labor and
small local businesses to provide inputs, which lowers unemployment and
support entrepreneurs. The presence and participation of the formal
sector in slums can help to integrate communities into the broader
economy of the city and reverse the marginalization of slum dwellers.
III. Current approaches to private
sector participation in slum upgrading
The private sector’s role in slum upgrading can take many
forms. An attempt to categorize these roles can be done along the lines
of who the private sector engages as a client and how that leads to
benefits for the poor. These client interactions are categorized as
private sector engagement with: i) local government; ii) community
organizations; iii) rich consumers, and; iv) directly with the poor.
Naturally individual projects and ventures may contain multiple
relationships and contracts linking the private sector to the poor,
altogether creating a diversity of options for mobilizing private
investment. All of these mechanisms direct private investment towards
the urban poor and the slum communities they live in, and can result in
a wide range of impacts including increased and more efficient service
provision, permanent infrastructure, innovative solutions to unique
problems of poverty, greater choice for poor consumers, integration of
slums into the formal sector and larger city, and social assistance to
the poorest slum-dwellers
In the following section, examples of private sector’s
involvement in slum upgrading are presented according to the kind of
business relationship the private sector engaged in, as a way to
understand where new projects may involve private sector. The private
sector must perceive a profitable transaction with all of its clients,
and so understanding how those relationships and contracts have been
developed to promote improved welfare for the poor is key to effectively
identifying opportunities for private investments in slum upgrading.
Beyond the four main categories of client interactions mentioned above,
are further links, including patron-beneficiary relationships, political
accountability relationships, regulatory relationships, and donor
accountability relationships which connect each of these clients to poor
people themselves, and can shape private sectors incentives,
investments, service quality, and other business decisions. This
multiplicity of potential connections creates a diverse universe of
potential private-public-individual partnerships, a selection of which
is presented below.
Client relationship Beneficiary
Local government’s mobilization of private finance
Decentralization has increasingly empowered local government
to act independently on matters of local development, including efforts
to upgrade slums. Resource and capacity constraints, however, remain
major challenges and create demand for finance and expertise in the
operation and implementation of public works and services. While often
bundled with public-private partnership projects that impact the city at
large, there are a number of examples where such activities are also
financing slum upgrading and service provision to poor areas. Donors
such as USAID have created finance facilities, such as the Community
Water and Sanitation Facility (CWSF), that provide gap funding and
credit guarantees to help municipalities access commercial finance for
slum infrastructure and service expansion projects.
Interest has also been growing in municipal bonds as a means
to mobilize private domestic capital for public projects. In India, the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation issued the first municipal bond in 1998
without a central government guarantee for the purpose of financing a
city-wide water and sanitation project that included many slum areas and
the Slum Networking Project “Parivartan.” In 2005, municipal
governments around Bangalore built on Ahmedabad’s success with a bond
issue called the Greater Bangalore Water and Sanitation Pooled Facility
that combined the commitments of 8 city governments. In both cases, the
success of the bond sales depended on the municipal governments’ having
previously demonstrated a revenue surplus and received a sufficiently
high credit-rating to ensure an interest rate in line with the
government’s projections of future ability to pay, among other
conditions. The ability of municipal governments to mobilize domestic
capital greatly enhances the scale at which municipal governments can
engage in development. Ahmedabad’s four municipal bond issues raised
$89.5 million between 1998 and 2006. The Greater Bangalore Facility
raised over $23 million with the assistance of a $780,000 partial credit
guarantee from USAID, essentially mobilizing over $29 in domestic
capital for every dollar donated.
The private sector can also be brought into project
implementation and service delivery through contracts and partnerships
with local government. Municipal governments that lack the capacity to
expand public services can pursue a range of public-private
partnerships. Table 1 lays out the basic characteristics of the main
types of public-private partnerships for infrastructure.
Table 1: Types of
private and public
be limited by license)
* Build-operate-transfer/ build-operate-own
Source: “Selecting an Option for Private Sector
Participation,” World Bank Toolkit, 1997.
The experience with public-private-partnerships in urban
slums has mainly been through components of larger projects that may
include an entire utility (water, sewerage, electricity, transport)
within a certain city or region. Municipal governments may hire a
private company to extend the water and sanitation network to new parts
of the city including slum communities (a service contract), or they may
include in a concession the commitment to extend service to certain slum
communities, which obliges the private company to recover the costs of
service provision and initial investment from their customers, including
the slum dwellers. Pilot projects to extend service to poor communities
in Jakarta as part of two separate water concessions have had some
success, although moving beyond the pilot phase has been difficult. In
Port Vila, Vanuatu, a concession contract successfully extended free
potable water service to poor areas through cross subsidies from
wealthier areas. In Manila, the concessionaires Mayniland Water Services
and Manila Water Company use a variety of internal programs and
partnerships with NGOs, community organizations and small entrepreneurs
to increase water distribution to slums.
Municipalities have discovered that involving the private sector in
public utilities and works is not without its problems, but as cities
continue to consider public-private partnerships as ways to improve
public services, service expansion to slums can be brought to the
negotiating table and integrated into PPP contracts.
Output-based aid (OBA) is a growing trend in structuring
subsidies to the private sector so as to ensure that performance
targets, particularly those related to service provision to the poor,
are met. OBA links the payment of subsidies to the demonstration of
specific service delivery or outputs, such as the connection of a set
number of new customers to the electrical grid or water distribution
network. Private providers must therefore shoulder their own risk of
non-performance and provide their own finance upfront (in most cases) to
meet the performance targets.
OBA has been particularly effective in extending water connections to
slums through one-time network extension and connection fee subsidies,
such as is being done in Manaus (Brazil), Jakarta, Manila, Mozambique,
Surabaya (Indonesia), and Ethiopia.
As with concessions and other public-private partnerships and contracts,
sufficient attention must be paid to mitigating payment risk on the part
of the government and to designing efficient and credible monitoring and
Communities as clients
When slum dwellers are locally organized into community
organizations or town councils, and particularly when they can ally
themselves with local NGOs, there is an opportunity for their collective
organization to attract the attention of the private sector and convince
private business and investment of their collective potential as a
client. Like local governments, local community based organizations (CBOs)
and NGOs can organize and partner with the private sector to acquire
goods and services that can then be enjoyed by all slum dwellers. The
Community-Led Infrastructure Finance Facility (CLIFF) bases its model on
the idea that local community organizations are capable of attracting
private finance for their slum upgrading activities in the same way
municipal governments can. The CLIFF provides grants for technical
assistance, capital, knowledge-sharing, and management costs in
additional to facilitating credit guarantees for local organizations
that are soliciting private and public finance in order to scale up
local solutions to the problems in slums. The Indian Alliance, a local
NGO, has been able to get financing for housing projects for slum
dwellers from domestic banks with only a 10% guarantee from CLIFF (down
from an over 100% guarantee 10 years ago).
UN-Habitat has piloted a similar finance facility, the Slum Upgrading
Facility (SUF), which looks to organize public, private and community
stakeholders to encourage involvement of all sectors in enabling
community organizations to carry out bankable slum upgrading projects.
Getting Private Water Utilities into Slums: Metro Manila Water
Metro Manila’s water authority was privatized in
1997 with the intention of solving problems of inefficiency and
financial shortfalls. Two 25-year concession contracts were
signed, one with Manila Water Company (composed of Ayala and
International Water) to cover the eastern zone of the city and a
second with Maynilad Water Services (Benpres and Ondeo) to cover
the western zone. Both concessionaires are required to expand
service coverage to 77-87% by 2001 and 95-98% by 2021. To
achieve this, both companies have had to devise strategies to
profitably extend water services to slums.
Although the concession agreement allows for the installation of
one public standpipe per 475 people in depressed areas, both
companies have worked to establish other types of connections
that bring water closer to people’s homes and ensure greater
revenue for the companies. Manila Water has introduced group
taps for 2-5 households to share a single connection
registration and water bill. The company has also introduced
community-managed water connections in which a community
association is responsible for a master meter and installs and
manages a distribution network to blocks or individuals. Manila
Water also permits private companies to buy water for resale
through private distribution networks, which the contractor must
take responsibility for maintaining.
Maynilad has actively sought out partnerships with NGOs to
extend individual household connections, preferred by customers
in all income groups, to slums. Its Bayan Tubig (Water for the
Community) program waives the land-title requirement in slums
and integrates payment of the connection fee into the first 6,
12, or 24 monthly water bills. NGOs, such as the Swiss chapter
of Médecins San Frontières and the local LINGAP Foundation in
Malabon, get communities involved to support ownership of the
program through information, education and community campaigns
and assistance to the poorest families through microfinance.
Maynilad additionally will contract with community-based
associations to provide billing and collection services, which
further localizes value creation in household water provision.
companies have enhanced their image and have decreased
non-revenue water through formalizing water provision
arrangements in slums where many people had been receiving water
through illegal connections and public standpipes. Through
their contract with the local government and their partnerships
with NGOs and community associations, these two private water
utilities are promoting access to safe, reliable potable water
in the poorest areas in Metro Manila.
From Almud Weitz and Richard Franceys eds., Beyond
Boundaries: Extending Services to the Urban Poor, Asian
Development Bank, August 2002,
pp. 56-60. See also, Richard Franceys and Almud Weitz,
“Public-Private Community Partnerships in Infrastructure for the
Poor,” Journal of International Development 15, 2003, p.
Communities can also organize to acquire other services from
the private providers who may be unprepared to market their services to
individual consumers in slum neighborhoods. In Port Vila, Vanuatu, a
private company provides solid waste collection services to many areas
of the city and recently began collecting from numerous centrally
located points in the peri-urban village of Mele. The company began
service in response to the village’s collective request for a contract,
and continues to deal with the village collectively through a health
management committee that selects the pick-up sites, collects donations,
and pays the company.
Community water boards are also a common way for poor neighborhoods to
convince water utilities to provide service, as the community assumes
the responsibility for collecting fees from users (often by applying
flat fees per house, apartment, or business instead of metering charges
which requires greater capital investment) and paying the monthly bill.
In microfinance for housing, effective NGO microlenders can
mobilize the credit histories of their member/borrowers in order to
access commercial lines of credit and therefore expand their pool of
funding. Genesis Empresarial, a Guatemalan NGO working in rural
microenterprise and housing lending for the poor, is an example of an
NGO that has gained access to credit lines from commercial banks, which
they then extend to their clients on a cost-recovery and even profitable
Lastly, when pursuing title to their land, often the only
viable option for poor slum-dwellers is to negotiate collectively,
particularly when land must be purchased from and financed by the
private sector. One such example is Terra Nova, a Brazilian for-profit
company that regularizes land that has been illegally occupied by
negotiating a fair price between the owners and residents, buying the
land, making improvements on it, and then immediately reselling it to
the residents at the collectively negotiated price. The organized
collective bargaining keeps owners and the company in check from pricing
the land above what the residents can pay.
Harnessing the private sector’s pursuit of high-end markets
Traditionally private businesses have focused on the
higher-income market for the bulk of their profits because of the high
profit margins this market permits and the higher perceived potential
for growth. This profit-seeking tendency towards higher-income
consumers can actually be harnessed to extend benefits to the poor
through government regulatory instruments and even activism with
higher-income consumers. The most common way private sector’s focus on
the high-end market is shaped to benefit the poor is through regulation
of tariff structures to create cross-subsidization. This is often seen
where water and sanitation utilities have been integrated with the
private sector. Tariffs can be set by zones to benefit poor slums or by
consumption levels, which set lower rates for a basic level of
consumption (often termed a lifeline block) and then increasing rates
for higher levels of consumption.
The type of price setting allows producers to lower the price for those
who won’t buy at higher prices, and therefore expand sales without
losing the revenue from higher prices applied to those who are willing
to pay more. The privatization of public utilities has its own
difficulties, but integrating such cross-subsidization of service
expansion to the urban poor in the contract conditions private
companies’ pursuit of the high-income market on its extension into the
low-income market as well.
Innovative land-use management techniques have also used this
approach to engage private developers in low-income housing and slum
upgrading. In US cities, mixed housing development regulations have
been used to oblige developers to produce and offer a certain number of
units within each newly developed neighborhood at prices that are
affordable to low-income households. In addition to producing housing
for poor families, it also has the added benefit of avoiding exclusively
low-income neighborhoods by integrating different levels of housing
within one new development.
In the developing world, the creation of “Transferable Development
Rights” (TDRs) has brought developers into the low-income market in much
the same way. In Mumbai, developers were offered an increase in the
permitted floor-surface-index (FSI) if they agreed to produce a given
number of low-income units. In cases of slums, the government would
require the developer to provide serviced housing in situ for all
families in the slum, although the slum could and would be densified,
but would allow the developer to take any remaining FSI and use it to
develop market-rate apartments or commercial units on the same site, or
transfer the FSI as TDRs to another location or sell them to another
developer for use elsewhere in the city.
Developers responded not to the opportunity to upgrade slums or produce
low-income housing, but to the opportunity to pursue more high-income
Even in cases where government was not involved, slum
communities have come to similar arrangements with developers that owned
the land where slums were situated but faced long court battles to evict
slum dwellers. In an arrangement called “land-sharing,” communities
agree to voluntarily vacate part of the land for commercial development
in return for receiving rights to occupy, and in some cases even housing
and basic services, on the less commercially-viable part of the land.
Examples include Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia and India.
While corporate social responsibility is not necessarily the
private sector’s most sustainable solution to the problems of urban
poverty, it is worth mentioning that companies are increasingly
recognizing the marketing power of philanthropy, particularly among
higher-income consumers. Just as “green products” are taking over the
high-end marketplace, socially responsible practices, such as fair wages
and giving back to local communities, are increasingly publicized to
attract greater brand loyalty from higher-income consumers. Activism
directed at companies and their preferred consumers can bring awareness
to the needs of the poorest people in slums, and contribute to greater
corporate responsibility and philanthropy for housing, health and
education services for the poorest of slum dwellers.
Direct marketing to the poor
While the urban poor undoubtedly struggle daily with limited
resources, they do rely on the cash economy to purchase most of what
they need to survive. The formal private sector often discounts the
profitability of marketing to the poor, but the growth of the informal
sector, which does target primarily the poor, is evidence of the buying
power of slum dwellers. There are numerous examples of private sector
innovation and market expansion directed towards what is increasingly
referred to as the “bottom of the pyramid.” Many of these are also
examples of private sector engagement improving the quality of life in
The private sector is particularly suited to housing markets,
a principal private good in slums. Non-profit microfinance institutions
are converting into for-profit lenders,
and private commercial banks are beginning to show interest in extending
lines of credit to housing microfinance lenders.
Loans are made available for progressive housing construction,
substitutes are made for collateral requirements including a shift away
from mortgage finance in favor of other forms of guarantees such as
group lending, and loans are bundled with savings and insurance services
to help mitigate risks for both the bank and the poor household.
Financial services are critical to the urban poor, who are
more integrated into the cash economy than the rural poor and yet face
many of the same barriers to accessing financial institutions. Carrying
cash after payday or to make a large payment also puts people at risk of
In the Philippines, Smart Communications and Globe Telecom have created
cell phone based financial services that allow users to pay for goods,
transfer money and cross-border remittances, purchase airtime, pay
utility bills and perform other financial transactions with the use of
text-messages. Globe Telecom’s systems do not even require the user to
open a formal bank account, rather it allows transactions through
partnered retail locations in addition to banks. The South African Bank
of Athens has created a virtual bank called “Wizzit” that gives its
customers a debit card and facilitates a number of transactions through
secure mobile phone systems and existing worldwide ATM networks.
Cemex, the leading Mexican cement producer, has gotten even
more directly involved in housing construction by targeting its
Patrimonio Hoy program to low and middle income families that are
building their homes one room at a time. Cemex allows households to
sign on to a 70 week program in which they make weekly payments in
return for scheduled deliveries of cement at key intervals in the
construction process. The price is locked in the day the household signs
up, and technical assistance is available as part of the club fee
charged to all program members. The credit provided for the purchase of
cement, plus the technical assistance and storage that is provided to
decrease loss of materials, have allowed families to add an additional
room in 60% less time and with 35% less expense and of higher technical
quality. Patrimonio Hoy has been an entirely commercial venture and
gained a strong foothold in the lower to middle income construction
market. Its success has led Cemex to extend it to the other countries
where the company has operations.
Health and hygiene are also areas that the private sector has
introduced products to be marketed to the poor. The poor often buy in
small quantities as they have little cash available and are hesitant to
commit too much money to any single purchase when their incomes are
unpredictable. Sachet packaging of soap, shampoo, and laundry detergent
and single dose sales of common painkillers, fever and cold medications
are giving poor people easy access to these products that were recently
The lack of health facilities in slums has inspired the development of
franchises of pharmacies that provide medical consults with physicians,
blood pressure checks, and other health services along with medicines
and health products, like condoms, clean syringes and
insecticide-treated bednets, in and around slum neighborhoods.
Franchisees get the benefit of brand recognition, and are obliged to
undergo quality audits to ensure a consistent level of service. The
poor have easier access to basic medical advice, and pharmacy doctors
and nurses can help recognize when clients should seek further care.
CFWshops in Kenya and Mi Farmacita Nacional in Mexico are both
successful examples of this model.
As discussed earlier, many of the most basic goods needed to
make slums livable are public goods or goods with strong externalities
that make individuals less likely to pay their full cost. The private
sector does not have strong incentives to produce these goods because
they cannot be sure that they will be able to recover their costs from
consumers. New innovations in payment for services, however, are
helping to alleviate these fears and mobilize private capital and
business towards the slums. The Aquacard, a debit card used to turn on
a water spigot, can be used by residents to purchase water from a shared
faucet without the markup of a local water vendor. The water provider
receives payments immediately through agreement with the bank where the
water debit accounts are held. Residents get the benefit of access to
water and prepayment that eliminates any risk of future unexpected debt,
and the water provider has 100% collection of user fees. The Sulabh
Sanitation Movement provides bathroom and washhouse facilities in slums
in India under a similar prepaid system whereby residents can purchase
monthly family passes and visitors can pay-per-use.
As described in the section on communities as clients, collective
responsibility for payment at the community level is also a way to
relieve private sector providers of the burden of revenue collection and
further induce them to enter markets.
The challenges of service provision to urban slums have
inspired a wide range of small-scale solutions by private entrepreneurs
whose business models are tailored to fit the unique structure of costs
and demand found in particular slum communities. While formal private
sector providers may have the advantages of scale and management
experience, small-scale providers have the advantages of flexibility in
product and process, and in-depth knowledge of specific local contexts.
In water, small-scale providers include owners of water tankers,
drillers of boreholes, and private venders who distribute water from a
standing tank, utility connection or a well through control of a
standpipe or through a local distribution network that is privately
Small-scale providers in communities without access to the electrical
utility grid have used diesel generators to provide energy to locally
built networks and even to charge 12-volt batteries for a fee.
Entrepreneurs have also provided sanitation services through the
emptying of pit latrines, a process that was studied by UN-Habitat in
1996, leading to the introduction of Vacutug, an improved version of
private providers’ waste-container pushcarts that includes a diesel
engine powered vacuum and a 500 liter tank.
While each individual venture is usually small, the total capital
invested in slums by small-scale providers is not: in Manila, one
small-scale water provider invested $350,000 in five years to deliver
water to 25,000 households; the small-scale providers in Ho Chi Minh
City have invested $80,000 in providing water to 400 household
Small-scale providers have developed a variety of solutions
to the needs of slum dwellers for water, sanitation, electricity,
telecommunications, and transport that are often second-best options yet
optimal under the given circumstances. They can sometimes, however, be
the first to introduce and test the pro-poor potential of technological
advances, such as internet, computer and cellular technology.
Their knowledge of the market, flexibility to try out innovative
technologies and business models, and existent capital investment in
slums, make small-scale providers an important part of the private
sector which has enormous potential in the provision of basic services.
2: Small Water Providers and OBA Strategies: Aguateros in
Like most Latin
American countries, Paraguay’s potable water is provided
principally by public water utilities—ESSAP in urban areas and
SENASA in rural areas—however, a total of 17% of residential
water connections are installed and serviced by approximately
400 independent small-scale water providers. These Aguateros
provide potable water to close to 500,000 mostly poor residents
of the peri-urban communities around Asunción and other cities
through independent wells and distribution networks servicing
300 to 3,000 households each. Aguateros are capitalist
entrepreneurs that invest their own funds or borrow from
commercial banks to take advantage of the growth in peri-urban
neighborhoods by setting up profitable water systems. They have
adapted their revenue-raising techniques to match the payment
abilities of their clients through market-rate financing of
connection fees, and initial flat-fee monthly tariffs before
later installing meters.
A working relationship between Aguateros,
some though not all of whom operate informally, and the
government has been negotiated over the 20 years since
Aguateros began doing business. The public utilities have
regulatory power over any water providers, and they review all
Aguateros’ bi-annual water quality certifications. They
are also increasingly exerting control over tariffs and fees
charged to users in response to some Aguateros’ acting
monopolistically and abusing users. The Aguateros have
also organized an association to represent their interests,
improve their own image and better negotiate with the
In 2002, working with the World Bank’s Global
Partnership on Output Based Aid, SENASA initiated a pilot OBA
program to take advantage of Aguateros’ and small
construction companies’ entrepreneurialism to provide potable
water to four rural villages. Builder-operator consortiums bid
for a contract that offered a per-connection subsidy contingent
on completion of a borehole, disinfection system, elevated or
pressurized ground storage tank, and distribution system with
working household connections in each of four communities.
SENASA negotiated the terms with local water users associations
to ensure agreement on users’ connection charges (beyond the
subsidy) and tariffs. The response from the communities has
been very positive, particularly due to the speed with which the
projects were brought to completion, supporting the hope that
partnerships between SENASA and Aguateros can continue to
extend access to water to small towns and peri-urban
The success that small-scale private water
providers have had in formalizing their business and engaging
with government regulatory agencies effectively deepened the
private water sector, and this created the competitive
conditions necessary for the success of output-based aid.
From “Aguateros: Small Scale Water Entrepreneurs,”
Upgrading Urban Communities: A Resource Framework, Section:
Case Examples, The World Bank Group,
and Franz Drees-Gross et al., “Output-Based Aid in Water:
Lessons in Implementation from a Pilot in Paraguay,”
OBApproaches Note Number 7, May 2005,
Private sector in promoting local economic activity
Many of the strategies companies use to target the low-income
market require bringing services closer to where people live and selling
them in small quantities at higher volumes. These strategies require
manpower within the slums, giving them an added benefit within slum
communities – the creation of jobs and income generating opportunities.
As companies expand to enter the low-income market, their labor forces
must increase, but perhaps most important are the jobs and
entrepreneurial opportunities that appear within the slums, and for
which slum dwellers are best prepared. Patrimonio Hoy employs local
promoters who receive commission for each new group of members that
signs onto the program. Franchise pharmacies give slum dwellers with
street-front property a lucrative business opportunity. Sulabh
washhouses require full-time attendants. In slums where unemployment is
truly high, these new sources of income for the poor cannot be
overlooked as part of the benefit of private sector engagement.
Judy Baker is a Lead Economist in the Urban Development Unit of the
Sustainable Development Network at the World Bank. Her book,
Evaluating the Impact of Development
Projects on the Poverty, was published in 2000. Kimberly McClain
is a program manager at the Washington, DC-based NGO Pact, where she
coordinates projects in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Myanmar in the areas of
potable water, non-formal education, HIV, and livelihoods. Excerpted
from draft of forthcoming article. Copyright 2008.
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), State of the World
Population 2007: Unleashing the Potential of Urban Growth, 2007,
See, United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat),
The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003,
Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2003, pp. 105-106 and Erhard Berner,
“Learning from informal markets: Innovative approaches to land
and housing provision,” Development in Practice 11:2/3,
May 2001, pp. 297-302, for a discussion of illegal sub-divisions
and other mechanisms by which slum dwellers purchase or rent
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), pp.
Harassment and eviction of slum dwellers by authorities can
result from the pressure of business interests to open up land
for development (Julia Viloria-Williams, Urban Community
Upgrading: Lessons from the Past – Prospects for the Future,
Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 2006, pp. 2, 9-10).
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), pp. 65,
see p. 78 (footnote 74) for examples of slum dweller
“relocation” for Olympics games.
The full paper is forthcoming, 2008. For information, contact
Judy Baker at firstname.lastname@example.org
A building boom in the 1980s in Bangkok created the development
pressure needed to make land sharing agreements appealing to
owners of squatted land (Shlomo Angel and Somsook Boonyabancha,
p. 110). Conversely, the fall in property values in Mumbai after
1997 adversely impacted the viability of the government’s TDR
scheme for slum upgrading (Vinit Mukhija, p. 801).
See United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), pp.
96-104 for an overview of economic and employment conditions of
See David S. Olinger, pp. 5-8, for a discussion of the range of
characteristics of formal and informal private sectors.
See discussion of the assumptions held by MNCs about the poor in
C.K. Prahalad, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid:
Eradicating Poverty through Profits, New Jersey: Wharton
School Publishing, 2005, p. 8-9.
John F. C. Turner, Housing by People: Towards autonomy in
building environments, New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.
Housing: Enabling Markets to Work, World Bank, Apr. 1993,
pp. 24, 28-30.
David L. Painter, “Scaling up Slum Improvement: Engaging Slum
Dwellers and the Private Sector to Finance a Better Future,”
TGCI Development Innovation, June 2006, p. 16.
See C.K. Prahalad’s discussion of the Indian government’s
relationship with the private sector, p. 6-7.
Richard Franceys and Almud Weitz, “Public-Private Community
Partnerships in Infrastructure for the Poor,” Journal of
International Development 15, 2003, p. 1084.
Patricia Clarke Annez, “Urban Infrastructure Finance from
Private Operators: What Have We Learned from Recent Experience?”
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4045, Nov. 2006, pp.
For Brazil see Jessica Budds, Paulo Teixeira and SEHAB,
“Ensuring the right to the city: pro-poor housing, urban
development and tenure legalization in Sao Paulo, Brazil,”
Environment and Urbanization 17, 2005, p. 96. For India, see
Sundar Burra, “Towards a pro-poor framework for slum upgrading
in Mumbai, India,” Environment and Urbanization 17, 2005,
See United United Nations Human Settlements Programme
(UN-Habitat), pp. 167-72.
C.K. Prahalad connects the lack of land titles to the poor’s
preference for holding wealth in durable household items as
opposed to immovable land and housing improvements. C.K.
Prahalad, p. 12.
For a full discussion of types of slum formation and tenure, see
United Nations Human Settlements Programme, pp. 79-88.
Catherine Farvacque-Vitkovic, Lucien Godin, Hugues Leroux,
Florence Verdet, and Roberto Chavez, Street Addressing and
the Management of Cities, Directions in Development,
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005, pp. 36-39.
C.K. Prahalad, pp. 8-10, 20-1.
Government and charitable organizations have often gone along
with the “dominant logic [that]…the private sector
[is]…exploitative of the poor” (C.K. Prahalad, pp. 6-7, 9).
The Next 4 Billion: Market Size and Business Strategy at the
Base of the Pyramid, World Resources Institute, 2007, p. 16.
Attributed to Friedrich Schneider (2005); quoted from The
Next 4 Billion, p. 16.
C.K. Prahalad, p. 11-12.
David L. Painter, p. 11.
C.K. Prahalad describes the poor’s integration into the formal
market economy as providing opportunities for acquiring a formal
identity, p. 107.
“Community Water and Sanitation Facility: A Cities Alliance
Initiative,” Factsheet from the Fourth World Water Forum, Mexico
City, March 2006.
David L. Painter, pp. 19-20.
See Almud Weitz and Richard Franceys eds., Beyond Boundaries:
Extending Services to the Urban Poor for examples of
problems with pro-poor concessions. See Meera Mehta, “Balancing
Commercial Viability with the Needs of the Poor in the
Development of Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Projects,”
Project Notes 14, USAID Indo-US Financial Institutions
Reform and Expansion Project – Debt Market Component FIRE(D),
for issues related to integrating service provision to the poor
into commercially viable projects.
Ian Morris, Financial Services Coordinator, Homeless
International, telephone interview, March 28, 2008.
Ruth McLeod, “SUF Local Finance Facilities: what they are, why
they are important, and how they work,” UN-Habitat Slum
Upgrading Facility (SUF) Working Paper 8, April 2008.
Almud Weitz and Richard Franceys eds., Beyond Boundaries,
Juntas Administradoras de Agua (administrative water boards) are
the most common mechanism for charging for water and maintaining
distribution systems that provide through household connections
in poor slums and rural villages in Honduras (Author’s
experience). Water boards are also used in poor slums in Manila
(Richard Franceys and Almud Weitz, “Public-Private Community
Partnerships…,” p. 1093).
Ivo Imparato and Jeff Ruster, Slum Upgrading and
Participation: Lessons from Latin America, Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2003, p. 284.
Vinit Mukhija, “Enabling Slum Redevelopment in Mumbai: Policy
Paradox in Practice,” Housing Studies 16:6, 2001,
Shlomo Angel and Somsook Boonyabancha, “Land Sharing as an
Alternative to Eviction: The Bangkok Experience,” Third World
Policy Review 10:2, 1988, pp. 107-127.
Many microfinance institutions have entered the field of housing
microfinance: “Cases in point include Banco Sol in Bolivia,
Banco Solidario in Ecuador, Mibanco in Peru, Banco Ademi in
Dominican Republic, Calpia in Honduras and Genesis Empresarial
in Guatemala.” (Bruce Ferguson, “Housing microfinance – a key to
improving habitat and the sustainability of microfinance
institutions,” Small Enterprise Development 14:1, March
2003, pp. 26-7)
PROA, an NGO working with Aymara and Quechua populations in El
Alto Barrio, receives funding for its shelter lending program
from Mutual La Paz, a traditional mortgage lender. Loans are for
home improvement, water and sewer line connections, titling, and
new constructions built by small contractors (David S. Olinger,
“The Role of the Private Sector in Delivering Low Income Housing
in Developed and Developing Countries,” International Housing
Coalition, paper prepared for the World Urban Forum III,
Vancouver, Canada, June 2006, pp. 23-24). Genesis Empresarial
has also received a commercial line of credit from local
commercial banks for housing microfinance (Ivo Imparato and Jeff
Ruster, p. 284 and
David L. Painter, pp. 11-18.
The Next 4 Billion, p. 97.
The Next 4 Billion, pp. 102, 104.
See “Combining Profit and Social Development,” Global
Envision, May 27, 2003,
www.globalenvision.org/library/5/484 [accessed Feb. 15,
2008], or Ricardo Sandoval, “Block by Block,” Stanford Social
Innovation Review, Summer 2005.
C.K. Prahalad, pp. 16-18.
The Next 4 Billion, p. 35, 39-40.
Almud Weitz and Richard Franceys eds., Beyond Boundaries,
In Cebu, small-scale providers manage small household
distribution networks from their own private wells in areas not
reached by the public utility. In Delhi, tricycle services can
be hired to transport water from a public standpipe to the home.
In Dhaka, 9,100 households are provided minimal water through an
illegal distribution network that draws water without charge
from the public utility network. In Ho Chi Minh City, almost 20%
of residents get their water from small providers who resell
water from their private connection, operate water tankers,
manage small pipe networks, sell bottled water, or in one case,
provide well water through a partnership with the public water
utility. (Arthur C. McIntosh, Asian Water Supplies – Reaching
the Poor, Asian Development Bank, London: IWA Publishing,
Yemen has achieved high levels of rural electrification through
private networks powered by diesel generators. In parts of
Africa, 12-volt batteries are a popular energy source and
private generator owners charge to re-charge batteries. (David
Ehrhardt, “Impact of Market Structure on Service Options for the
Poor,” for the conference Infrastructure for Development:
Private Solutions and the Poor, May 31 – June 1, 2000, London,
Graham Alabaster and Iole Issaias, “Removing human waste – the
Vacutug solution,” Habitat Debate: Water and Sanitation for
Cities 9:3, September 2003, p. 17.
Private internet cafes and village telephone operators are often
the first to connect residents to information technology, and
their services by necessity often include training and promotion
of the various uses of these technologies in order to attract
and keep their clients. Small-scale providers and poor
consumers alike are generally “more willing to adopt new
technologies because they have nothing to forget.” (C.K.
Prahalad, p. 16)
For a discussion of how to engage small-scale providers, see
Marianne Kjellen and Gordon McGranahan, “Informal Water Vendors
and the Urban Poor,” IIED Human Settlements Discussion Paper
Series, March 2006,
http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/10529IIED.pdf, pp. 19-23.
listing of the goals, targets, and indicators for MDGs,” World
Small Scale Water Entrepreneurs,” Upgrading Urban
Communities: A Resource Framework, Section: Case Examples,
The World Bank Group,
Graham, and Iole Issaias, “Removing human waste – the Vacutug
solution,” Habitat Debate: Water and Sanitation for Cities
9:3, September 2003.
and Somsook Boonyabancha, “Land Sharing as an Alternative to
Eviction: The Bangkok Experience,” Third World Policy Review
10:2, 1988, pp. 107-127.
“Learning from informal markets: Innovative approaches to land
and housing provision,” Development in Practice 11:2/3,
May 2001, pp. 292-307.
Paulo Teixeira and SEHAB, “Ensuring the right to the city:
pro-poor housing, urban development and tenure legalization in
Sao Paulo, Brazil,” Environment and Urbanization 17,
2005, pp. 89-113.
“Towards a pro-poor framework for slum upgrading in Mumbai,
India,” Environment and Urbanization 17, 2005, pp. 67-88.
Regina and Laura Moser, “Scaling up Housing Microfinance for
Slum Upgrading,” Housing Finance International, December
Patricia, “Urban Infrastructure Finance from Private Operators:
What Have We Learned from Recent Experience?” World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 4045, Nov. 2006.
Profit and Social Development,” Global Envision, May 27,
www.globalenvision.org/library/5/484 [accessed Feb. 15,
Water and Sanitation Facility: A Cities Alliance Initiative,” Factsheet from the Fourth World Water Forum, Mexico City, March
“Scope and scale of Small Scale Independent Private Water
Providers in 8 Asian Cities,”
Franz et al., “Output-Based Aid in Water: Lessons in
Implementation from a Pilot in Paraguay,” OBApproaches
Note Number 7, May 2005,
David, “Impact of Market Structure on Service Options for the
Poor,” for the conference Infrastructure for Development:
Private Solutions and the Poor, May 31 – June 1, 2000, London,
Pricing Policy,” Water and Sanitation for All: A
Farvacque-Vitkovic, Catherine, Lucien Godin, Hugues Leroux,
Florence Verdet, and Roberto Chavez, Street Addressing and
the Management of Cities, Directions in Development,
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.
Bruce, “Housing microfinance – a key to improving habitat and
the sustainability of microfinance institutions,” Small
Enterprise Development 14:1, March 2003.
“FIABCI Premia Cohapar e Terra Nova, Do Parana,” FIABCI
Brasil Informa, Apr. 19, 2005,
Richard and Almud Weitz, “Public-Private Community Partnerships
in Infrastructure for the Poor,” Journal of International
Development 15, 2003, p. 1083-1098.
GPOBA Activities (updated Feb. 22, 2008),
Housing: Enabling Markets to Work, World Bank, Apr. 1993.
and Jeff Ruster, Slum Upgrading and Participation: Lessons
from Latin America, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003, p.
Marianne and Gordon McGranahan, “Informal Water Vendors and the
Urban Poor,” IIED Human Settlements Discussion Paper Series,
and Debolina Kundu, “Urban Local Government and Private Sector
Partnership in Gujarat,” in Ponna Wignaraja and Susil
Sirivardana eds., Pro-Poor Growth and Governance in South
Asia: Decentralization and Participatory Development,
London: SAGE Publications, 2004.
Slum Upgrading Project,”Upgrading Urban Communities: A
Resource for Practitioners, The World Bank Group,
Arthur C., Asian Water Supplies – Reaching the Poor, Asian
Development Bank, London: IWA Publishing, 2003,
“SUF Local Finance Facilities: what they are, why they are
important, and how they work,” UN-Habitat Slum Upgrading
Facility (SUF) Working Paper 8, April 2008.
“Balancing Commercial Viability with the Needs of the Poor in
the Development of Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Projects,”
Project Notes 14, USAID Indo-US Financial Institutions
Reform and Expansion Project – Debt Market Component FIRE(D),
“Enabling Slum Redevelopment in Mumbai: Policy Paradox in
Practice,” Housing Studies 16:6, 2001, pp.791-806.
S., “The Role of the Private Sector in Delivering Low Income
Housing in Developed and Developing Countries,” International
Housing Coalition, paper prepared for the World Urban Forum III,
Vancouver, Canada, June 2006.
aid: Supporting infrastructure delivery through explicit and
performance-based subsidies,” OBApproaches Note Number 5,
L., “Scaling up Slum Improvement: Engaging Slum Dwellers and the
Private Sector to Finance a Better Future," paper presented at
the World Urban Forum III, June, 2006.
Bindeshwar, “Toilets for all,” Habitat Debate 9:3, United
Nations Human Settlements Programme, Sept. 2003, p. 13.
Bindeshwar, “Sanitation is the key to healthy cities – a profile
of Sulabh International,” Environment and Urbanization
11:1, Apr. 1999,
The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty
through Profits, New Jersey: Wharton School Publishing,
Edward, “The World Bank & Urban Programmes in Zimbabwe: A
Critical Appraisal,” Review of African Political Economy
33:109, pp. 515-523.
Sandoval, “Block by Block,” Stanford Social Innovation Review
Tillmann and Robert LK Tiong, “The impact of political risks on public-private partnership (PPP)
opportunities in Asia,” 2005,
Payment Systems,” Water and Sanitation for All: A
International Social Service Organization website, Profile, Aims
The Next 4 Billion: Market Size and Business Strategy at the Base of the
World Resources Institute, 2007.
Turner, John F.
C., Housing by People: Towards autonomy in building
environments, New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.
Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), The Challenge of
Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003, Sterling,
VA: Earthscan, 2003.
Population Fund (UNFPA), State of the World Population 2007:
Unleashing the Potential of Urban Growth, 2007.
Julia, Urban Community Upgrading: Lessons from the Past –
Prospects for the Future, Washington, DC: World Bank
and Richard Franceys eds., Beyond Boundaries: Extending
Services to the Urban Poor, Asian Development Bank, August
“100 millones de lempiras podría obtener Siri Zúñiga por
negligencia de Alcaldía en pleito de tierras ejidales,”
Revistazo.com 6, Jan. 2003,
Return to top